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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARROLL C. NICHOLS, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
BOX ELDER BOARD OF EDUCATION, : 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, and DARRELL K. WHITE, : 
Superintendent, 
: Case No. 940555-CA 
Defendants and Third 
Party Plaintiffs/Appellees, : 
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION, : 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE 
and STATE OF UTAH, : 
Third Party Defendants/ : 
Appellees. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter on appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is whether the lower 
court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Third 
Party Appellees. The lower court correctly ruled that the State 
retirement in H.B. 142 did not entitle Nichols to cash for 
accrued sick leave because he was not eligible for such payment 
under the District's early retirement program. The proper 
standard is to review the trial court's decision for correctness, 
in the light most favorable to the losing party, and to affirm 
only when it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material issues of fact. Seare v. University of Utah School of 
Medicine, No. 930326-CA (Utah App. Sept. 15, 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, and rules are set forth in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802 (Supp. 1987) 
(H.B. 142 (1987)) - Addendum 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-401 (Supp. 1987) -
Addendum 2 
Box Elder School District Policy on Leaves 
of Absence - Addendum 6 
Box Elder School District Policy on Early 
Retirement - Addendum 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Carroll C. Nichols sued Box Elder School District 
seeking cash payment for certain benefits pursuant to the 
District's early retirement policy, or, in the alternative, 
pursuant to a theory of quantum meruit on the basis of his 
employment for a number of years. 
Box Elder School District joined Third Party State 
Defendants and Appellees in this action because savings generated 
from the 1987 H.B. 142 early retirement window were remitted to 
Third Party Appellees and a judgment in favor of Plaintiff would 
also run against funds received by Third Party State Appellees. 
Summary judgment was granted in favor of all Appellees on all 
causes of action. Nichols now appeals the order of dismissal of 
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his third, cause of action, a claim for accrued, but unused, sick 
leave based on a theory of quantum meruit, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Third Party Appellees Utah State Office of Education 
and State of Utah state the uncontested facts as follows: 
Appellant Nichols was a certificated teacher employed 
by Box Elder School District. He took early retirement at age 59 
in May of 1987, pursuant to the provisions of H.B. 142 (1987), 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802 (Supp. 1987). Addendum 1. 
H.B. 142 offered an alternative early retirement to 
teachers and State employees on a one-time basis (i.e., a 
"window" of opportunity to elect early retirement) only during 
April and May 1987. H.B. 142 offered a financial incentive of 2% 
of the final average salary multiplied by all years of service. 
The regular retirement formula resulted in a longer period of 
required service and less retirement compensation. Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-3-401 (Supp. 1987). Addendum 2. 
The purpose of H.B. 142 was to generate financial 
savings for the State in a year of financial exigency in the 
State's economy. The State Office of Education was charged with 
certifying the correct amount of savings resulting from 
application of the early retirement law to school districts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802(4)(d) (Supp. 1987). Addendum 1. 
At age 59, Nichols applied for early retirement under 
H.B. 142 on May 29, 1987. As part of his application for early 
retirement, plaintiff signed a "Member Information Request/Early 
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Retirement Incentive Program" form, which contained the following 
statements: 
I hereby certify that I am not going to 
receive any stipend offered by my employer. 
This stipend does not include vacation or 
sick leave payments or payment of medical and 
life insurance premiums. 
Question: Have you taken sabbatical leave or a leave 
of absence? 
Answer: No. 
Deposition of Vilate Whittle, Retirement Manager, Exhibits 1, 2; 
R. 206 to 210. Addendum 3. 
If Nichols had answered "yes" to the foregoing 
question, thereby indicating that employment was not yet 
terminated, his application for retirement would not have been 
allowed. Id. at 18, 19; R. 198 to 199. Addendum 4. 
Three days after his Friday, May 29, 1987 application, 
on Monday, June 1, 1987, Nichols applied to Box Elder School 
District for a leave of absence, with the clear understanding 
that his teaching position might not be available upon return 
from his leave of absence. Plaintiff's letter to Superintendent 
Darrell White, dated June 1, 1987; R. 171. Addendum 5. 
Under the District leave of absence policy, 
reinstatement was contingent upon availability of a teaching 
position for which the teacher was qualified. Only those 
teachers reinstated received the same status for purposes of 
benefits and insurance as they held at the time such leave was 
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granted. Box Elder School District Policy on Leave of Absence, 
Section 4-7-1; R. 170. Addendum 6. 
The relevant F3ox Elder School District Retirement 
Policy in 1987 contained a provision for retirement at age 65 
pursuant to the long-standing regular State retirement system 
which included school districts. Box Elder School District 
Certificated Personnel Policy, Retirement, Sections 3-1 to 3-3-2; 
R. 130 to 131. Addendum 7. 
In addition to the policy for regular retirement, the 
District's Retirement Policy contained an early retirement 
incentive program. After reaching age 61, a district educator 
became eligible to receive early retirement based on certain 
provisions: (a) agreement on a "bilaterally agreed written 
contract'1 between the Superintendent and the educator; (b) all 
benefits for early retirement to be computed on the final year of 
full time service; and (c) incentive program to commence at the 
beginning of the school year in the year chosen for retirement. 
See District Retirement Policy, Early Retirement Incentive 
Program, Section 3-4-1; R. 131 to 132. Addendum 7. 
Nichols never applied for the District's early 
retirement incentive program. He never requested or arrived at a 
"bilaterally agreed upon written contract" with the 
Superintendent. Nichols' Responses to Requests for Admissions. 
Addendum 8. 
Nichols elected early retirement pursuant to the H.B. 
142 alternative voluntarily and with full knowledge that he 
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waived both the Box Elder School District early retirement and 
leave of absence benefits, and he admitted he had no guaranteed 
expectation of reinstatement with full benefits. Nichols' 
Responses to Requests for Admissions. Addendum 8. 
Nichols claimed that he was entitled to reinstatement 
of benefits under the District's Leave of Absence Policy and also 
to the benefits of the District's Early Retirement Policy, in 
addition to the compensation provided by the State's one time 
H.B. 142 early retirement alternative. The court granted summary 
judgment on all claims in favor of all appellees. R. 367 to 371 
and 411 to 412. Addendum 9. 
Nichols' third claim, in a second amended complaint, of 
entitlement to sick leave benefits based solely on his employment 
with the Box Elder School District before 1987, was denied in a 
second summary judgment. Findings of Fact, Conclusions and 
Judgment and Decree. R. 451 to 456. Addendum 10. Nichols 
appeals from the denial of this third claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By taking retirement at age 59 pursuant to the 1987 
State H.B. 14 2 early retirement "window," Nichols precluded 
himself from also being eligible for benefits under the Box Elder 
School District's early retirement program at age 61. A retiree 
cannot quit employment to retire under the State retirement plan 
and also continue employment to become eligible for accrued sick 
leave pay under a separate district program. Nichols' claim for 
pay for accrued sick leave has no basis in contract or policy and 
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his mere employment prior to 1987 alone is not sufficient to 
entitle him to a cash payment for unused sick leave. His claim 
for $16,885.00 of unpaid sick leave is invalid. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT NICHOLS COULD NOT BE ENTETLED TO THE 
LEGISLATURE'S H.B. 14 2 EARLY RETIREMENT WINDOW AND AT 
THE SAME TIME ADDITIONALLY BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR DISTRICT 
EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFITS. 
It is undisputed that Nichols took early retirement 
under the state's "one time window of opportunity" in H.B. 142. 
He applied on May 29, 1987, indicated his last day worked was to 
be September 15, 1987, and his retirement was to be effective 
September 16, 1987. R. 206. Addendum 3. 
The retirement law clearly requires actual termination 
of employment in order to retire: 
(1) Any member of this system may retire 
^nd receive the benefit allowed under 
Subsection (2) if the member meets the 
following requirements as of the effective 
date of retirement: 
(a) The member is eligible for 
retirement under Section 49-3-401, or 
otherwise has 25 years of service credit; 
(b) The member elects to forfeit any 
stipend for retirement offered by the 
employing unit; and 
(c) The member elects to retire from 
this system by applying for retirement by 
the date established under Subsection 
(3)(a) or (3)(b). 
(2) A member who retires pursuant to 
Subsection (1) shall receive 2% of that 
member's final average salary for all yeairs 
of service credit. No actuarial reduction 
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may be applied to the benefit granted under 
this section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). 
Addendum 1.l 
This section refers to the conditions of eligibility 
set forth in the regular retirement systems. Section 49-3-401 
specifically addresses the requirement that the employee quit 
work: 
(1) Any member who qualifies for service 
retirement may retire by applying in writing 
to the retirement office stating the proposed 
effective date of retirement, which may not 
be more than 90 days after the date of 
application and which shall be effective on 
the 1st or 16th day of the month following 
the last day of actual work. 
(2) The member is qualified to retire upon 
termination of services on or before the 
effective date of retirement if one of the 
following requirements on that date is met: 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-401 (Supp. 1987) See Addendum 2. 
Thus, to take early retirement under H.B. 14 2, Nichols 
had to actually terminate employment. He understood he could not 
remain employed and indicated that he did not take a leave of 
absence or sabbatical. R. 209. Addendum 3. Retirement Director 
Whittle stated that his application for early retirement under 
H.B. 14 2 would have been denied if his employment had been 
continued by a leave of absence. R. 198 to 199. Addendum 4. 
Nichols' subsequent attempt on June 1, 1987, to 
maintain employment by means of a leave of absence is contrary to 
1
 The 1993 Amendments did not change the substance of this 
section. Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802 (1994). 
law. The leave of absence could only benefit Plaintiff upon 
reinstatement to a District position. Reinstatement is not 
automatic and never occurred. 
At age 59, Nichols deliberately elected to retire early 
under the state ''Retirement Window," acknowledged that he was 
actually terminating employment, and thereby precluded further 
employment, with the District. Even if the leave of absence were 
somehow legally valid, Nj.chols was never actually reinstated and, 
therefore, has no claim to sick leave benefits. These could have 
been available only upon his reinstatement and subsequent early 
retirement at age 61. Box Elder School District Certificated 
Personnel Policy. Addendum 7. 
POINT II, 
THE BOX ELDER SCHOOL DISTRICT'S RETIREMENT PROGRAM AND 
THE STATE'S EARLY RETIREMENT INCENTIVE UNDER H.B. 142 
ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE ELARLY RETIREMENT ALTERNATIVES. 
When the District's Early Retirement Incentive Program 
(Addendum 7) is compared with H.B. 142, it becomes clear that 
election of early retirement under the state's H.B. 142 incentive 
plan precludes early retirement under the District's program. 
That Is, Nichols could elect one or the other plan, but could not 
choose both. 
In early 1987, Nichols at age 59 could only become 
eligible for the District's Early Retirement Incentive Program 
when he met the District's requirements of age 61 or 30 years' 
service. In March of 1987, the Legislature created the state's 
alternative, the H.B. 14 2 Early Retirement Program Window. 
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Nichols had a clear choice: elect either the District's program 
in two years at age 61 or the state's plan immediately. He 
elected the state's plan. If Nichols had taken the District's 
early retirement plan, he could have retired at ages 61 to 64, 
and then taken the District's regular retirement at age 65. In 
contrast, at age 59 he was eligible immediately for the 
Legislature's H.B. 142 -plan, which combined an early retirement 
incentive (2% for each year of service) with an ongoing 
retirement plan that would continue for life. 
The regular State retirement plan, which included 
teachers, was set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-401 and 402 
(Supp. 1987). H.B. 142 was an entirely separate statute designed 
as a one-time "window" of opportunity, intended to generate 
savings for the state by encouraging early retirement in a time 
of financial exigency. Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802 (Supp.1987).2 
See Addendum 1. 
Gunn v. Board, of Educ. of Euclid City, 554 N.E. 2d 130 
(Ohio App. 19 88), presented a somewhat similar situation: twelve 
former teachers left the school system under an early retirement 
plan. After their retirement, the Board adopted a new, more 
favorable incentive plan for prospective retirees. The former 
2
 Subsequently, the regular retirement law was amended to 
include the higher 2% formula, but this later amendment has no 
bearing on Nichols' case. He made his election, applied for 
early retirement with full knowledge, and is now bound by his 
election even though the later law might have resulted in 
increased benefits if he had waited. Gottfredson v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 808 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1991). 
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teachers sued, alleging breach of contract, fraud, deprivation of 
constitutional rights, and unfair labor practices. The trial 
court granted summary judgment for the Board; and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed- Nichols cannot take early retirement and then 
return and claim benefits for which he was not eligible at the 
time. 
The fact that Plaintiff might have become entitled to 
compensation under either option 1 or option 2 of the District's 
Early Retirement Incentive Program is irrelevant because his 
election to take the H.B. 142 Early Retirement Plan automatically 
precluded him from either option under the District's program. 
Nichols was not entitled to early retirement compensation under 
both .programs at the same time. 
H.B. 142 contained specific provisions for waiver of a 
"stipend" (i.e., the annual general early retirement incentive 
payment from the District) in order to be eligible for the 
state's early retirement window. H.B. 142 also preserved 
specific retirement benefits under the District policy and 
allowed the District to deduct the cost of paying those benefits 
to eligible retirees from savings before remitting the net 
savings to the State.3 
3
 (d) (i) Each year, any excess savings derived from 
this early retirement incentive which are 
above the costs of funding the increase and 
the costs of paying insurance, sick leave, 
compensatory leave, and vacation leave under 
Subsections (c)(i) and (c)(ii) shall be 
reported to the Legislature and shall be 
appropriated as provided by law. 
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The intent of H.B. 142 is clear from its face: the cost 
of paying for the designated vested retirement benefits of 
insurance, sick leave, compensatory leave, or vacation leave 
under the District's retirement program was to be offset against 
savings, thereby avoiding a penalty to the District, which had to 
pay its eligible early retirees under its policy. The purpose of 
H.B. 14 2 was to create a separate one-time early retirement 
incentive, not to create a new entitlement in early retirees to 
cash payment for accrued sick leave merely upon termination of 
employment. An employee not eligible for early retirement 
benefits under the District policy remained ineligible despite 
H.B. 142. 
(ii) In the case of Subsection (c)(i), the 
Division of Finance shall establish an 
account into which all savings derived from 
this early retirement incentive shall be 
deposited as the savings are realized. 
(iii) In the case of Subsection (c)(ii), 
the State Office of Education shall certify 
the amount of savings derived from this early 
retirement incentive. 
(iv) The State Office of Education and the 
employing unit may not spend the savings 
until appropriate by the Legislature as 
provided as provided by law. 
(5) A member who retires under this section is subject 
to Section 49-1-505. 
(6) The retirement board may adopt rules to implement and 
administer this section. 
Utah Code Ann. 49-3-802(4)(d)(5)(6) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis 
added). Addendum 1. 
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The difficulty with Nichols's position is that, when he 
left the District's employ at age 59, he was not eligible for 
early retirement under the District's policy. Therefore, he was 
not entitled to be paid for unused sick leave, to which only 
District eligible early retirees were entitled. Furthermore, he 
could not continue his employment contrary to law by the device 
of a 2-year leave of absence so as to create eligibility at age 
61. 
POINT III 
ABSENT ELIGIBILITY FOR THE DISTRICT'S EARLY RETIREMENT 
PROGRAMS, APPELLANT NICHOLS HAS NO RIGHT TO PAYMENT OF 
CASH FOR UNUSED SICK LEAVE. 
As a teacher in Box Elder School District, Appellant 
Nichols would have become entitled to the District's early 
retirement program upon becoming eligible at age 61, applying for 
early retirement, and negotiating an early retirement agreement 
with the superintendent. As part of the District's retirement 
program, the District sponsored an early retirement incentive. 
After 10 years of service, a teacher at age 61 could elect to 
take early retirement and receive a yearly stipend until regular 
retirement at age 65. Part of the District's early retirement 
incentive was to pay the early retiree for any accumulated unused 
sick leave. 
In other words, when a teacher reached age 61 and 
became eligible for early retirement, he could elect the 
District's early retirement program. The teacher could apply 
for, negotiate the precise terms of compensation, and take early 
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retirement. If the teacher had any accumulated unused sick 
leave, he would receive a payment for that leave depending upon 
his age. A teacher would become entitled to such payment only 
upon becoming eligible, applying for and taking early retirement 
pursuant to the District policy. 
Nichols, at age 59, instead elected to take the early 
retirement pursuant to the state's H.B. 14.2 window. While H.B. 
142 allowed the District to pay for retirement benefits and 
deduct the payments from savings remitted to the state, there 
never was authorization to create a new entitlement to benefits 
for ineligible teachers. Nichols was never eligible for the 
District's early retirement program; therefore, he was not 
entitled to any payment for accumulated but unused sick leave. 
While he was employed, Nichols was always entitled to 
sick leave. The benefit of sick leave is a matter of employment 
policy. But mere employment alone does not entitle Nichols to be 
paid for accumulated but unused sick leave upon leaving 
employment. Payment for unused sick leave is a matter of 
retirement policy and based on eligibility. In order for Nichols 
to have a valid claim for payment for unused sick leave upon 
termination, he had to have some basis in contract or policy. 
Absent eligibility for the District's early retirement program, 
there is no such basis. 
Nichols claims that his employment prior to 1987 alone 
is sufficient to create an entitlement to be paid for unused sick 
leave. Whether a person leaving employment is entitled to be 
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paid for unused sick leave depends upon the particular employment 
po]icy or contract under which the individual is employed. In 
the Box Elder School District, payment for accumulated but unused 
sick leave was a matter of retirement benefit to encourage 
retirement at a particular age. There is no evidence that 
payment for unused sick leave benefits was ever a matter of 
additional compensation. There is no evidence that any other 
employee has ever been paid for unused sick leave before becoming 
eligible for that payment at retirement under the District's 
policy. 
In support of his contention, Nichols cites at length 
from Gilman v. County of Cheshire, 493 A.2d 485 (N.H. 1985), 
which involved the death of an employee. The employee's estate 
proceeded against the employer county for compensation for unused 
sick leave accumulated at the time of the employee's death. The 
court reviewed various amendments to the company's sick leave 
policy. There was never any contest over payment in lieu of sick 
leave; instead, the only issue was which formula was to be used 
in calculating the payment. Prior to September 24, 1980, there 
was no provision for compensation for accumulated unused sick 
leave. On September 24, 1980, the county adopted a written 
policy that after 5 years, upon termination for reasons other 
than cause, an employee would be compensated for accrued sick 
leave at the regular rate. 493 A.2d at 486. On May 19, 1982, 
the county amended its policy to allow direct cash payment for 
accumulated but unused sick leave to employees at the end of the 
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year at the rate of one-half day pay for each day of sick leave 
accumulated. The employee died on October 4, 1982. 
Because the decedent's employment covered periods when 
different policies were in effect, the issue before the court was 
the total amount of payment for unused sick leave. 493 A.2d at 
487. The court found that because the right to receive pay for 
accrued sick leave was authorized by policy, the decedent's 
estate had a right to receive payment. 
Payment for sick leave, where authorized 
in the terms of the employment, is not a mere 
gratuity, but constitutes compensation for 
services rendered. Such payment is in the 
nature of deferred compensation in lieu of 
wages earned. Once the services are 
rendered, the right to receive the promised 
compensation vests. 
Id. at 489 (emphasis added). The decision would have been 
different if plaintiff had died before September 1980, when the 
policy was first introduced. Gilman cannot provide authority for 
Nichols' claim because Box Elder School District has never 
authorized payment for accrued sick leave upon termination alone. 
The case does stand for the proposition that authority for such 
payment must be found in policy and cannot be inferred from mere 
employment alone. Likewise, in City of North Little Rock v. 
Voqelqesanq, 619 S.W.2d 652 (Ark. 1981), the lower court granted 
judgment to seven terminated police officers for payment of 
unused sick leave. The city appealed and the appellate court 
reversed, thereby disallowing payment for accrued sick leave 
based on employment alone. 
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The appellees argue that they had a vested 
contractual right to their accumulated sick 
leave because they "contributed" to the plan, 
not in money but by coming to work when they 
might have stayed away and charged their 
absence to sick leave. We do not find this 
argument persuasive. The ordinary meaning of 
the words "sick leave" contemplates an 
illness rather than an optional holiday with 
full pay. 
Id. at 652. The Voqelqesanq court did allow payment for accrued 
sick leave to the extent of the city's "plan," so long as the 
plan was in effect. However, Box Elder School District has never 
had any "plan" other then the early retirement program, for which 
Nichols was not eligible. 
Cf. Marsille v. City of Santa Ana, 64 Cal. App. 3d 764 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (compensation for accrued sick leave 
benefits granted permanently disabled firemen because of clear 
legislative intent to provide for it). 
In a case analogous to this one, a city attorney 
resigned employment to work at another job and he applied for 
cash payment for his unused accrued sick leave. The City of 
Rockford denied the reguest, and the attorney sued. The lower 
court held that the attorney was appointed and was subject to a 
policy that excluded salaried employees from payment for accrued 
sick leave. The Court of Appeals, in McCarty v. City of 
Rockford, 421 N.E.2d 576 (111. App. 1981), upheld the denial of 
cash for accrued leave upon termination, as opposed to death or 
retirement: 
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The plaintiff's claim at that time was 
clearly subject to the conditions set out in 
the 1979 Rockford ordinance. His claim was 
inchoate until then--it was not a lump sum of 
cash which he was entitled to demand during 
his employment but an extra emolument to be 
paid to him upon his death or retirement as 
defined. 
Id. at 579. 
From the foregoing, the compelling conclusion is that a 
sick leave policy alone does not entitle the employee to 
additionally be paid for unused sick leave upon termination, 
unless the terms of employment, either in contract or personnel 
policy, call for it. Box Elder School District's employment 
policy did not allow payment for unused sick leave. The 
District's retirement policy allowed payment of unused sick leave 
as part of the early retirement incentive, a program for which 
Nichols was never eligible. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Third Party Appellees State 
of Utah and State Office of Education respectfully request that 
the summary judgment entered April 8, 1994, (R. 456) by the 
district court be affirmed. 
Dated this 20th day of October, 1994. 
/I , ) 
/ 7 7 ^ W - ^ ^ C / ^ t ^ U y 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Third Party 
Defendants/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802 (Supp. 1987) 
(H.B. 142 (1987)) 
49-3-802. Early retirement incentive — Eligibility for this 
early retirement plan — Calculation of benefit — 
Payment of costs of early retirement incentive — 
Savings to be appropriated by Legislature — Re-
strictions on reemployment. 
(1) Any member of this system may retire and receive the benefit allowed 
under Subsection (2) if the member meets the following requirements as of the 
effective date of retirement: 
(a) the member is eligible for retirement under § 49-3-401, or other-
wise has 25 years of service credit; 
(b) the member elects to forfeit any stipend for retirement offered by 
the employing unit; and 
(c) the member elects to retire from this system by applying for retire-
ment by the date established under Subsection (3)(a) or (3)(b). 
(2) A member who retires pursuant to Subsection (1) shall receive 2% of 
that member's final average salary for all years of service credit. No actuarial 
reduction may be applied to the benefit granted under this section. 
(3) In order to receive the benefit allowed by this section, a member shall 
submit an application to the retirement office as follows: 
(a) For state and school employees under level A, the application shall 
be filed by May 31, 1987. The effective date of retirement shall then be set 
by the employee on the first or sixteenth day of July, August, or Septem-
ber, 1987. If a level A employee elects to retire, the administrator or 
employer may request the employee to delay the effective date of retire-
ment until a later date, but no later than June 30, 1988. If the employee 
agrees to delay the effective retirement date, the effective date shall be 
delayed, but no service credit may be accrued after the original effective 
date of retirement elected by the employee, and no salary earned after 
that effective date may be used in the calculation of the final average 
salary for determining the retirement benefit. 
(b) For political subdivisions under level B, the application shall be 
filed by September 30, 1987. The effective date of retirement shall then be 
set by the employee on the first or sixteenth day of July, August, Septem-
ber, October, November, or December, 1987. 
(4) (a) The cost of providing the benefit under this section shall be funded in 
fiscal year 1987-88 by a supplemental appropriation in the 1988 General 
Session based on the retirement contribution rate increase established by 
the consulting actuary and approved by the board. 
(b) The cost of providing the benefit under this section shall be funded 
beginning July 1, 1988, by means of an increase in the retirement contri-
bution rate established by the consulting actuary and approved by the 
board. 
(c) The rate increase under Subsections (4)(a) and (b) shall be funded: 
(i) for state employees, by an appropriation from the account estab-
lished by the Division of Finance under Subsection (4)(d) which is 
funded by savings derived from this early retirement incentive and a 
work force reduction; 
(ii) for school employees, by direct contributions from the employ-
ing unit, which may not be funded through an increase in the retire-
ment contribution amount established in the School Finance Act; and 
(iii) for political subdivisions under level B, by direct contributions 
by the employing unit. 
(d) Each year, any excess savings derived from this early retirement 
incentive which are above the costs of funding the increase and the costs 
of paying insurance, sick leave, compensatory leave, and vacation leave 
under Subsections (4)(c)(i) and (4)(c)(ii) shall be reported to the Legisla-
ture and shall be appropriated as provided by law. In the case of Subsec-
tion (4)(c)(i), the Division of Finance shall establish an account into which 
all savings derived from this early retirement incentive shall be deposited 
as the savings are realized. In the case of Subsection (4)(c)(ii), the State 
Office of Education shall certify the amount of savings derived from this 
early retirement incentive and neither the State Office of Education nor 
the employing unit may spend the savings until appropriated by the 
Legislature as provided by law. 
(5) A member who retires under this section may not cancel the retirement 
and return to active employment with a unit covered by this system and 
continue to accrue service credit under this system. 
(6) The retirement board may adopt rules to implement and administer this 
section. 
(7) The Legislative Auditor General shall perform an audit to ensure com-
pliance with this section. 
History: C. 1953, 49-3-802, enac ted by L. makes the act effective on March 18, 1987, 
1987, ch . 243, § 4. without the governor's signature. 
Effective Dates . — Laws 1987, ch. 243, § 5 
ADDENDUM 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-401 (Supp. 1987) 
49-3-401. Eligibility for service retirement — Date of re-
tirement — Qualifications. 
(1) Any member who qualifies for service retirement may retire by apply-
ing in writing to the retirement office stating the proposed effective date of 
retirement, which may not be more than 90 days after the date of application 
and which shall be effective on the 1st or 16th day of the month following the 
last day of actual work. 
(2) The member is qualified to retire upon termination of services on or 
before the effective date of retirement if one of the following requirements on 
that date is met: 
(a) the member has been credited with at least four years of service and 
has attained an age of 65 years or more; 
(b) the member has been credited with at least ten years of service and 
has attained an age of 62 years or more; 
(c) the member has been credited with at least 20 years of service and 
has attained an age of 60 years or more; 
(d) the member has been credited with at least 30 }rears of service; or 
(e) the member is credited with at least 25 years of service, in which 
case the member shall be subject to the reduction set out under Subsec-
tion 49-3-402(2)(b). 
History: C. 1953, 49-3-401, enac t ed by L. Effective Dates . — Laws 1987, ch 1, § 182 
1987, ch . 1, § 70. makes the act effective on July 1, 1987. 
ADDENDUM 3 
Carroll Nichols' Application for Early-
Retirement Pursuant to H.B. 14 2 
(Utah Code Ann. § 49-3-802J, 
00142 
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540 EAST 200 SOUTH S A LT LAKE CiTY UTAH 34102 PHQNE 355-3884 
APPLICATION FOR FINAL OBSIGNATION ON SCRV1CE RCTIRCMCNT 
P«g* t 
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 acco rdance w«th the statutes govern ing the Retirement System I hereby make appi<cat«on for reuror-.ent benef i ts 
5 ALL BLANKS MUST BE COMPLETEO IN ORDER TO BEGIN PROCESSING YOUR APPLICATION 
S Full name (rfr^r / / ' ^  'J'' C A c/ * Scca. p u r i t y no ^ ^ ^ " V 7 " ' V<?26 
z
 Date of b i r th / ^ < 7 ( / / ^ / ^ ff Vzz.lzl 3*<«u3 / 1/s.(rr~ ' CCf 
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Effect ive re t i rement date FIRST day of (month -year ) _ 
P Last day w o r k e d Last day pa id . 
Emp loye r CJL Posi t ion 
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X M E N T A L D E A T H BENEFITS IS F I N A L A N D C A N N O T BE C H A N G E D 
Z | want to receive my ret i rement a l l owance unde r the provis ions of the p lan se lected be low (mark ONE box on ly ) 
^ Q * 1 Prov ides the m a x i m u m a l lowance payab le du r i ng my l i fe t ime At death o n l y the check cover ing the m o n t h of my death 
- j - is to be pa id to my benef ic iary 
Q #2 Prov ides an a l lowance payab le d u r i n g my l i fe t ime wi th the p rov i s i on if m y dea th occurs before the accumu la ted 
^ c o n t r i b u t i o n s have been re tu rned as the annu i t y oaymont of my re t i rement benef i t , any remain ing balance is to be paid 
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z
 Q *5 Prov ides an a l lowance payab le d u r i n g m y l i fe t ime At death the same a m o u n t is payable to my spouse as long as my 
^ spouse l ives If my spouse d ies be fo re m e . the a l lowance is rever ted to the m a x i m u m ret i rement a l lowance under Plan 
2 One 
3 a »6 Prov ides an a l lowance payable d u r i n g m y l i fe t ime At death one-ha l f the s r<oun i is payable to my spouse as long as /nv 
\^ spouse l ives if my spouse d ies be fo re me . the a l lowance is rever ted to the m a x i m u m ret i rement a l lowance under P<an 
CC One 
a
 The f o l l o w i n g benef i ts may be taken m a d d i t i o n to the regular re t i rement p lan se lected (Write 'none if you d o not want 
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J?5 P^S* ^ 
Spouses s igna ture ( requi red) _-
Te lephone n u m b e r *7 ^  ^ ~ 7*T f& A 1 Address -P S>  i>{  A/ " ^  r~' s~ (J 
Date L/7/,?.<; P<? / $ r ? ^ ^ - v / / / - ,<. / 9V162-
STATE OF U T A H J ^ V ^ V 
C O U N T Y OF jAXr+/^^A&^S ^ 
the above-earned app l i can t k n o w n t o t o b e t h e m d i v i d u a l he re i r 
persona l ly appea red before me ano /hav ina *>««-» * « ' , -«-^««« acknow ledged to me that h e / s h ^ e a d understood and e ^ C o t e d the 
same of h is /her o w n free wm and cho ice w i t hou t any undue in f luence 
SEAL My c o m m i s s i o n expires _ 
Form 3' 1A 
RETURN A L L COPIES TO T H E UTAH STATE R E T I R E M E N T BOARD | i E X H 1 B I T I ' Rev 4,85 
J. 0<*U CLdbl OW^UHU o u u m 
51 / * S a , t L ^ 0 C i fv Ulah 84102 Early Retirement Incentive Program 
J^^J^f (801) 355-3884 
INSTRUCTIONS: Complete the following form and return it to the Retirement Office with your retirement application. 
If you are a state or school employee, your retirement application must be filed with the Retirement Office by 
May 31 f 1987. If you are employed with a political subdivision, your application must be filed by September 
30, 1987. 
[NAME " — — 
feTARTlNGT>ArE OF EMPLOYMENT 
ISDC. SEC. NO. 
TOTAL YEARS OF SERVICE AT RETIREMENT 
Oo any of the following apply? If you answer "yes", please give effective dates. 
DO YOU HAVE PART-TIME SERVICE? 
| | YES fT^NQ OATE(S): 
HAVE YOU TAKEN SABBATICAL LEAVE OR A LEAVE OF ABSENCE? 
| | YES Q ' N O OATE(S): 
0 0 YOU HAVE ELECTED OR APPOINTED SERVICE? 
| j YES 0 ^ 0 OATE(S): 
DO YOU HAVE TIAA SERVICE? 
• YES Q ^ 0 OATE(S): 
HAVE YOU TAKEN ANY REFUNDS? <Jr?ul 6-+^ ^^J" $*£ 
g y E S D"Q °"*»
 DiiJ j.u,„ ^ ft,V.<j 
DO YOU HAVE DUAL EMPLOYMENT COVEREO BY THE RETIREMENT SYSTEM? 
f ~ j YES [ j NO DATE(S): 
The following documents must accompany your retirement application and this form: 
1. Copies of your W2's for the highest 3 years' salary in your career. 
Educators Only: Have your pay patterns changed during the last 3 years? (i.e.. from 12 month 
base to 9 or 10 month, etc.) Q Yes Q No If ~yes*\ specify change<s) and change date(s). 
2. Copies of a proof-of-age document tor yourself and your spouse and a marriage certificate. 
I hereby certify that I am not going to receive the stipend offered by my employer. This stipend does not 
include vacation or sick leave payments or payment of medical and life insurance premiums. 
SIGNATURE^ D A T T 
( ' fmmammmtmmmm^ RTRQ-I *» RTRQ-1 fWv 3*7 
- EXHIBIT 
B 
Q 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Deposition of Vilate Whittle, 
(Pages 18 and 19) 
vtm i uirra ww u p a g e l Jt THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
^ 
* * * 
CARROLL C. NICHOLS, 
Plaintiff, 
- v-
BOX ELDER BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, BOX ELDER 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
and DARRELL K. WHITE, 
Superintendent, 
Defendants and 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF 
EDUCATION, UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT OFFICE AND 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Third Party 
Defendants . 
Case No. 900000542 
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF 
VILATE WHITTLE 
TAKEN AT: 540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DATE: July 1, 1993 
REPORTED BY: Ken Allen, RPR, CSR 
^ 
CAPITOL 
REPORTERS 
175 South Mam. #510 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
(801)363-7939 
# 
File No. 
2 3 
24 
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Nichols' answer to that question? 
A. No . 
Q. So you assumed at that point that he 
had not taken sabbatical leave or leave of 
abs ence? 
A. That's right. 
Q. If he had answered yes to that 
question, what would you have done? 
A. We would be very interested to know 
when he took either a sabbatical or a leave of 
abs ence. 
Q. What would have happened had you found 
out that he had taken a leave of absence? 
A* If it were a leave of absence sometime 
within his career, it would cause a gap in his 
service credits and we would be talking with the 
district about what he was paid, if anything at 
all, for that year so we could see if there were 
any service credits to be given. 
If he took a leave of absence at the 
time he left the district in 1987, September, we 
would not have allowed retirement. Leave of 
absence does not constitute a termination. 
Q. Let me be clear on that. So if he had 
been on a leave of absence and so indicated on this 
KEN ALLEN -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
form, you would not have allowed him to retire 
under this special retirement window? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And why is that, pursuant to what? 
A. Pursuant to the fact that they have to 
be terminated, as far as we're entrusted with the 
documents they've given us. They're telling us 
that they have terminated. When an individual 
fills out a retirement application one of the 
questions is last day work and last day paid, and 
we rely on that. We would not allow retirement 
otherwise, if they were not terminated. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. And on another 
matter, going back to the questions of Mr. Hansen 
relating to our, meaning the Utah Retirement 
Systems, responsibilities and relationships with 
local school districts, if, for example, 
contractual negotiations took place with teacher 
unions and the school district relating to hours of 
work or sick leave credits or special retirement 
stipends or incentives, would we ever enter into 
those negotiations with them? 
A. No, we wouldn't. 
Q. Would you ever have a role in those 
negotiations at all? 
KEN ALLEN -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
ADDENDUM 5 
Carroll Nichols' Letter Requesting Leave 
of Absence from Box Elder School District 
BOX ELDER SCHOOL DISTRIC 
DARf?ELl K. WHITE SUPERINTENDENT CARROLL NICHOLS, ADM I N I STRAT I YE AS S rS !.• 
FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND CURRICULUM SERVIi 
June 1, 1987 
Supt. Wniie ana 3oara of Education 
Box Elder School District 
230 West 200 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Dear Supt. 'white and Board of Education: 
I respectfully request a leave of absence from September 15 
1987 to June 1, 1989. I understand my position may not be 
available. 
incerely, 
: a r r o 1 I C . Nichols 
23C Wes: Second ScLih • Brigham City. Utah 843G2 • Phone (8CD 723-528; 
ADDENDUM 6 
Box Elder School District Policy 
on Leaves of Absence 
"4-7-1 LEAVES OF ABSENCE - Any educator may apply 
for a Leave of Absence without salary and insurance. The 
reasons for granting such leaves will be considered on an 
individual basis. Reinstatement upon return from a Leave 
of Absence will be contingent upon the availability of a 
position for which the educator qualifies. Reinstatement 
in the position previously held is not guaranteed except 
as specified by law or as otherwise stated and by mutual 
agreement. Leaves of Absence will be granted for a 
period not to exceed two (2) years with the option to 
request an extension of one additional year. Requests 
for extension must be approved by the Board 'of Education 
at least four (4) months prior to the end of the initial 
Leave of Absence. Those reinstated shall receive the 
same status as when the Leaves were granted, namely: 
step on insurance and other benefits granted by these 
policies. Educators desiring to return to employment in 
the District following a Leave of Absence must notify the 
Personnel Office of their intent to return, at least four 
(4) months prior to the intended date of return." 
ADDENDUM 7 
Box Elder School District Policy 
on Early Retirement 
0 
p s a es: 
;Vfc 
i-•*•** I i ^ ^ 
3306-A 
CATCCORY 3. RETIRLM£NT 
3-1 T:\i Box Elder County School D i s t r i c t R e t i r e m e n t P o l i c i e s w i l l comply w i t h 
t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Utah S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t Board (See Appendix C) . 
3_2 Cnce r e t i r e d , e d u c a t o r s may t>e r e h i r e d on a t e m p o r a r y b a s i s w i t h t h e 
a p p r o v a l of t h e Board . 
3-3 P r o t e s s i o n a l - jnp loyees l e a v i n g employment w i t h t h e Box Cider School 
D i s t r i c t , due t o r e t i r e m e n t s h a l l r e c e i v e an amount of money, (bused on a 
g i v e n per c e n t ) of t h e v a l u e of h i s / h e r a c c u m u l a t e d s i c k l e a v e (not t o 
r e c c e d c o n t r a c t e d d a y s of employee) . 
3 -3 -1 T m s amount of ironcy w i l l be b a s e d upon h i s / h e r a n n u a l s a l a r y a t t h e t i m e 
of r e t i r e m e n t and age a s of Sep tember 1. 
3 -3 -2 Tr^ cor c e n t of a c c u m u l a t e d s i c k l e a v e w i l l be c a l c u l a t e d a s f o l l o w s : 
Any age under 6 1 , w i t h t h i r t y (30) y e a r s 
o r more work e x p e r i e n c e in a p u b l i c s c h o o l 
d i s t r i c t in t h e S t a t e of Utah by J u l y 1 60% 
Ag e 61 60 % 
Age 62 50% 
/vie 63 40% 
A^e 64 30% 
Age 65 20% 
3-4 E a r l y R e t i r e m e n t I n c e n t i v e Program 
3 - 4 - 1 An e d u c a t o r who, by S e p t e m b e r 1 , h a s t h i r t y (30) or more y e a r s of 
t e a c h i n g e x p e r i e n c e in Utah o r who h a s c o m p l e t e d t e n (10) o r more y e a r s 
of s e r v i c e w i t h i n t h e D i s t r i c t may r e t i r e a t a g e 6 1 , 62 , 6 3 , o r 6 4 . 
T e a c h e r s c h o o s i n g t h i s o p t i o n , a s w e l l a s t h o s e u n d e r 61 who r e t i r e under 
t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e S t a t e Employee R e t i r e m e n t Act (30 y e a r s o r more 
p r o v i s i o n ) . a r e e l i g i b l e t o r e c e i v e e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s b a s e d on t h e 
f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n s : 
3 - 4 - 1 - 1 Tne t u n e and c o n d i t i o n s of s u c h s e r v i c e s h a l l b e i n c l u d e d m a 
b i l a t e r a l l y a g r e e d upon w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n t h e e d u c a t o r and 
t h e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t . 
3 - 4 - 1 - 2 All b e n e f i t s fo r e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t w i l l be computed on t h e b a s i s 
of t h e s a l a r y s c h e d u l e c u r r e n t d u r i n g t h e l a s t y e a r of f u l l - t i m e 
employment of t h e e d u c a t o r c o n t e m p l a t i n g e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t . 
3 - 4 - 1 - 3 The e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t i n c e n t i v e program w i l l commence a t t h e b e -
g i n n i n g of t h e s c h o o l y e a r in which t h e e d u c a t o r c h o o s e s t o 
r e t I r e . 
1985 
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3 - 4 - 1 - 4 Once s u c h a r e t i r e m e n t c o n t r a c t h a s been m u t u a l l y a g r e e d u p o n , 
t h e employee w i l be o f f e r e d a d d i t i o n a l y e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t 
i n c e n t i v e c o n t r a c t s u n t i l t h e employee r e a c h e s h i s / h e r 6 5 t h 
b i r t h d a y , o r u n t i l t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e f o u r - y e a r e n t i t l e m e n t 
p e r i o d , wh icheve r i s f i r s t . 
3 - 4 - 1 - 5 C o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t i n c e n t i v e program w i l l be 
b a s e d on one of two o p t i o n s : 
3 - 4 - 1 - 5 - 1 OFriON HI - Por and in c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f work ing 40 d a y s per 
y e a r in t h e D i s t r i c t , t h e r e t i r e e w i l l r e c e i v e 50 p e r c e n t 
o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e be tween S t e p 1, B . S . D e g r e e , and t h a t l a n e 
and s t e p which h e / s h e i s on a t t h e t ime of e a r l y r e t i r e m e n t , 
o r , i f e l i g i b l e for S o c i a l S e c u r i t y , t h e maximum a l l o w e d , 
w i t h o u t p e n a l t y , by t h e S o c i a l S e c u r i t y S y s t e m . If and when 
t h e maximum a l l o w e d b y S o c i a l S e c u r i t y e x c e e d s t h e 50% 
d i f f e r e n t i a l , t h e e d u c a t o r w i l l r e c e i v e an i n c e n t i v e e q u a l 
t o t h e 50% d i f f e r e n c e a s n o t e d a b o v e . T h i s c o m p e n s a t i o n w i l l 
b e p a i d on a m o n t h l y b a s i s . 
A r e t i r i n g e d u c a t o r may a t h i s / h e r o p t i o n , t r a d e up t o one 
h u n d r e d s i x t y (160) u n u s e d s i c k l e a v e d a y s — f o r t y (40) 
d a y s p e r y e a r in l i e u o f t h e work r e q u i r e m e n t . 
An e d u c a t o r may make a o n e - t i m e change from O p t i o n §1 
t o O p t i o n S2. 
3 - 4 - 1 - 5 - 2 OPTION U - If an e d u c a t o r c h c b s e s no t *_o work 40 d a y s fen 
t h e Schoo l D i s t r i c t , t h e f o l l o w i n g i n c e n t i v e s t i p e n d w i l l be 
p a i d t o t h e r e t i r e e : 
Year o f 
R e t i r e m e n t Age 6 1 * Age_ 62_* A^e_ 6 3 * Age 64* 
1 $2,500 $2,000 $1,500 $1,000 
2 2 , 0 0 0 1,500 1,000 
3 1,500 1,000 
4 1,000 
*This also applies to those educators with 30 or more years 
professional experience in the State of Utah. 
1985 
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3 - 4 - L - 6 The Board s h a l l m a i n t a i n t h e c o s t of p remiums o f t h e g r o u p h e a l t h 
and a c c i d e n t i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y for h o s p i t a l , s u r g i c a l and e x t e n d e d 
b e n e f i t s , u n t i l a g e 6 5 , o r for four c o n s e c u t i v e y e a r s , wh ichever 
o c c u r s f i r s t , b u t n o t t o exceed t h e c o s t of a c o u p l e * s c o v e r a g e . 
Those e a r l y r e t i r e e s who have need of f a m i l y c o v e r a g e must pay 
t h e d i f f e r e n c e in premiums be tween c o u p l e and f a m i l y c o v e r a g e . 
The Board w i l l a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e e m p l o y e e ' s R e t i r e m e n t and 
S o c i a l S e c u r i t y on t h e anounc of t h e c o n t r a c t . 
3 - 4 - 1 - 7 A l l paymen t s w i l l t e r m i n a t e 30 d a y s a f t e r t h e d e a t h of t h e 
r e t i r e e i f d e a t h s h o u l d o c c u r a t any p o i n t b e t w e e n a c t u a l e a r l y 
r e t i r e m e n t a n d / o r t h e c o n s e c u t i v e f o u r - y e a r e n t i t l e m e n t . 
- 4 3 -
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ADDENDUM 8 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Requests for Admissions 
(June 21, 1993) 
Robert B. Hansen #1344 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838 18th Ave. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: 801 322-1796 or 467- 5437 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARROL C. NICHOLS, ] 
Plaintiff, \ 
vs. ] 
BOX ELDER B0ARD OF EDUCATION, ) 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL ] 
DISTRICT, and DARRELL K. WHITE, ; 
Superintendent, ] 
Defendants and ] 
Third Party Plaintiffs, ; 
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF ' 
EDUCATION, UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT OFFICE AND STATE ] 
OF UTAH ] 
Third Party Defendants. ] 
1 ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT, UTAH 
1 STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION'S 
I FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
) REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
i Civil No. 900000542 
) Judge: Clinton Judkins 
Plaintiff hereby submits the following Answers to Interrogatories and admissions 
pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1. Referring to Plaintiffs first claim, paragraph No. 3, 
alleging that Plaintiff filed for retirement and also requested a leave of absence, please state: 
a) Whether the filing for retirement was in writing, and if so produce a copy of the 
filing. 
b) Whether the request for leave of absence was in writing, and if so, produce a copy 
of the request. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
1. Admit that Plaintiff signed and applied for the State sponsored Early Retirement 
Program under HLB. 142 (1987) on May 28, or 29, 1987. 
Response to No. 1 Admits. 
2. Admit that Plaintiff requested a leave of absence on June 1, 1987, subsequent to 
his application for retirement.. 
Response to No. 2 Admits. 
3. Admit that upon requesting the leave of absence Plaintiff understood that there 
was no guarantee or obligation on the part of Defendant Box Elder Board of Education to furnish 
Plaintiff a position at the conclusion of the leave of absence. 
Response to No. 3 Admits but alleges he fully expected that he would be given one 
based on the districts past policies and practices. 
4. Admit that Plaintiff has never applied for the Box Elder District's Local Early 
Retirement Incentive Program. He alleges this suit was such an "application", however. 
Response to No. 4 Admits. 
5. Admit that the state sponsored H.B. 142 Early Retirement Incentive Program was 
separate program from the local Box Elder District Early Retirement Incentive Program. 
Response to No. 5 Denies. The State mandated certain features of local districts 
programs (length of service) and the local district hand book required conformity to State program. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
State of CALIFORNIA : 
County of J^^^TUA^CT^ 
Carrol C. Nichols, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
that he is the Plaintiff in the above mentioned matter, that he has read the foregoing Response to 
Defendant*s First Set of Interrogatories and that he understands the contents thereof, and that the 
same is true of his own personal knowledge, except as to those matters stated upon information and 
belief, or which are essentially legal conclusion and as to those matters, he believes the same to be 
true. 
On the/ J day of J. 
CarrollC Nichols, Defendant 
_, 1993, personally appeared before me, the 
undersigned notary, Carroll C. Nichols, the signer of the foregoing Response to Plaintiffs First Set 
of Interrogatories, who duly acknowledged to me that she signed the same voluntarily and for its 
stated purpose. 
y n />, r\ rfVndfw 
KUHEHNE BAUMGARTEN" 4 
Caeam.t»7BSJ3 £ 
7>fc^^ 
H^erwac-cauraKtt 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at, V*-^. 
My Commission Expires: 
ADDENDUM 9 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment and Decree 
(December 3, 1993) 
Reed W, Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARROLL C. NICHOLS, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
BOX ELDER BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, and DARRELL K. ] 
WHITE, Superintendent, 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, ; 
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF ] 
EDUCATION, UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT OFFICE AND STATE ] 
OF UTAH, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 900000542 
i Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
Third Party Defendants. 
This matter having come on regularly for oral arguments before 
the above-entitled court on the 10th day of November, 1993 before 
the Honorable Clint S. Judkins, Associate District Judge, pursuant 
to Motions for Summary Judgment having been filed by all of the 
Defendants and Third-Party Defendants, and Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment having been filed by the Plaintiff; each of the 
parties having been given an opportunity to submit memoranda and 
ICC- ^ w -
L4.JU- 2 '. W t f 
authorities in support of their position, and the Judge of said 
Court, after hearing of all said arguments, entered his decision 
from the bench granting the Defendants and Third-Party Defendants 
Motions for Summary Judgments and denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment,, and pursuant thereto the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law constituting the decision 
of the Court are hereby made and entered on motion of Reed W. 
Hadfield, attorney for the Defendants Box Elder Board of Education, 
Box Elder County School District, and Darrell K. White, 
Superintendent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Plaintiff in this case applied for retirement on May 
29, 1987, He terminated his employment with the Box Elder County 
School District on September 16, 1987. Plaintiff, at that time, 
retired. 
2. The Plaintiff applied for a leave of absence on June 1, 
1987; a leave of absence was granted by the Box Elder School Board 
on June 10, 1987, and that leave of absence was from September 15, 
1987 to June 1, 1989. 
3. At the time of his retirement, the plaintiff was the age 
of 59 years and four months; he had only 25 years of service under 
the Utah State Retirement System. 
4. The Box Elder School District retirement and the State 
House Bill 142 early retirement incentive are mutually exclusive 
retirement plans. The plaintiff had a choice between the District 
or the State Plan pursuant to House Bill 142. The plaintiff opted 
for the State Plan pursuant to House Bill 142. When he did that, 
by its very terms, he waived any stipends from the District, with 
the exception of vacation or sick leave payments, or payments for 
medical or life insurance premiums. The Court finds that those two 
exceptions are not stipends. 
5* As relates to Plaintiff's claim for the 4 0 days of work 
per year for the four (4) years, the Court will adopt Judge Low's 
reasoning in his Memorandum Decision in Case No. 900000183 dated 
March 26, 1992 as relates to that and finds that this provision is 
a stipend. 
6. As to those exceptions to the stipend, the Plaintiff 
could have received either or both of the above; that is, the 
vacation or sick leave payments, or the medical or life insurance 
premiums, only if he qualified under the District's Plan. But the 
District's Plan required the Plaintiff to be over 61 and/or have 3 0 
years of service or its equivalent. The Plaintiff did not reach 
those requirements. The Court specifically rejects the Plaintiff's 
theory that he could terminate his employment and retire under the 
State Plan and also take a leave of absence under the District Plan 
and, therefore, did not retire until he was 61. 
7. The Court rejects the Plaintiff's theory that passage of 
House Bill 142 automatically amended the provisions of the District 
Plan by reducing the requirement from 30 years to 25 years. 
8. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FACTS THE COURT 
FINDS: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff terminated his employment with the Box 
Elder County School District on September 16, 1987. 
2. The Plaintiff's retirement terminated his employment and 
would, therefore, terminate the leave of absence. 
3. When the Plaintiff elected to take the State Early 
Retirement Incentive Plan pursuant to House Bill 142, he waived any 
stipends from the District with the exception of vacation or sick 
leave, or payment for medical or life insurance premiums. As 
relates to Plaintiff's claim for the 40 days of work per year for 
four (4) years, the Court concludes that this was a stipend which 
the Plaintiff had waived. 
4. The Court concludes that since the Plaintiff did not 
satisfy the requirements of the vacation or sick leave payments, or 
the medical or life insurance premiums of the District, that he was 
not entitled to receive the benefits of said provisions. 
5. All of the Defendants and Third-Party Defendants are 
entitled to a summary judgment; this Court having found there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, which judgment is to be 
entered against this Plaintiff with prejudice. 
6. The Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
8. The granting of all of the Defendants' and Third-Party 
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment is dispositive of all of 
the claims in this matter, except for the Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend the Complaint, and that all claims except Plaintiff's Motion 
to Amend Complaint are dismissed with prejudice. 
Let summary judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED this day of , £993 
CLINT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this c^L/ru day of November, 1993, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to the following: 
John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Mark A. Madsen 
Kevin A. Howard 
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement Board 
540 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Thomas D. Roberts 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
tr/2:school.fnd 
Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 72 3-34 04 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARROLL C. NICHOLS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
BOX ELDER BOARD OF EDUCATION, J 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, and DARRELL K. ] 
WHITE, Superintendent, 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, J 
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF ) 
EDUCATION, UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT OFFICE AND STATE ) 
OF UTAH, 
| JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Civil No. 900000542 
) Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
Third Party Defendants. 
This matter having come on regularly for oral arguments before 
the above-entitled court on the 10th day of November, 1993 before 
the Honorable Clint S. Judkins, Associate District Judge, pursuant 
to Motions for Summary Judgment having been filed by all of the 
Defendants and Third-Party Defendants, and Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment having been filed by the Plaintiff; each of the 
parties having been given an opportunity to submit memoranda and 
authorities in support of their position, and the Judge of said 
Court, after hearing said matter, made his ruling from the bench 
granting the Defendants and Third-Party Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment and denying the Plaintiff's Partial Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and pursuant thereto the Court having directed 
that Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be made and entered in 
favor of the Defendants and Third-Party Defendants and against the 
Plaintiff, which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law have been 
so made and entered and duly signed by the above-entitled Court, 
NOW, THEREFORE, and pursuant thereto, it is hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That summary judgment be granted in favor of all of the 
Defendants and Third-Party Defendants, except that concerning the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, the Defendants and Third-
Party Defendants shall be given 15 days in which to respond to the 
Motion, and the Plaintiff shall be given ten (10) days thereafter 
to file a response to their responses. 
2. The Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint against 
the defendants be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice 
no cause of action, 
3* The Third-Party Complaint filed by the Defendants against 
the Third-Party Defendants is hereby dismissed with prejudice no 
cause of action, except that the Court reserves the right to rule 
on the Plaintiff's Motion to file a second Amejnded Complaint, 
DATED this _) day of V\£0C tV\Y")V^ ,, 
CLINT S. JUDKIN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
QUi D, I hereby certify that on this -y V77J day of A^> r,n<Sf e 
1993, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment 
and Decree to the following: 
John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
838 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Mark A. Madsen 
Kevin A. Howard 
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement Board 
540 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Thomas D. Roberts 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
23 6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah £4H£ 
>2^ <Jx, -—5S> 
SECRETARY y ^ 
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ADDENDUM 10 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment and Decree 
(April 8, 1994) 
Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 72 3-3 404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARROLL C. NICHOLS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOX ELDER BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, and DARRELL K. 
WHITE, Superintendent, 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF 
EDUCATION, UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT OFFICE AND STATE 
OF UTAH, 
Third Party Defendants. 
This matter having come on regularly for oral argument before 
the above-entitled court on the 17th day of March, 1994 before the 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins, Associate District Judge, pursuant to 
Motions for Summary Judgment having been filed by all of the 
defendants and third party defendants; each of the parties having 
been given an opportunity to submit memoranda and authorities in 
i 
APR 1 2 1994 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 900000542 
Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
support of their position and the Judge of said court, after 
hearing all of said arguments, entered his decision from the bench 
granting the defendant and third party defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment, which motions were granted after the court 
granted the plaintiff's Motion to Allow Second Amended Complaint 
and pursuant to the granting of said Motions for Summary Judgment 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law constituting 
the decision of the court are hereby made and entered on motion of 
Reed W. Hadfield, attorney for defendant, Box Elder Board of 
Education, Box Elder County School District and Darrell K. White, 
Superintendent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The court hereby adopts the findings of fact as entered by 
this court on December 3, 1993 as the same apply to the Third Cause 
of Action. 
2. The courts finds that there was an express contract in 
existence between defendant, Box Elder County School District, and 
the plaintiff. That express contract is the same as set forth in 
Exhibit "A" attached to the Affidavit of Richard E. Kimber that was 
submitted to the court. 
3. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAV/ FROM THE FOREGOING FACTS THE COURT 
FINDS: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The court adopts Conclusions of Law entered by this court 
on the 3rd day of December, 1993 as the same apply to the Third 
2 
Cause of Action. 
2. The plaintiff's theory of implied contract to avoid unjust 
enrichment does not apply in this case. 
3. The granting of all of the defendants and third party 
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment is dispositive of all of 
the claims in this matter and all claims of the plaintiff are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Let summary judgment be entered accordingly 
DATED this 1f> day of A H ^ ** * * 1994, 
CLINT'S. ^ JBTDKINS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^ S T M day of \T\g^c^ r 
1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the 
following: 
John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
83 8 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Kevin A. Howard 
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement Board 
540 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
3 
Thomas D. Roberts 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
SECRETARY 
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Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne #1289 
Attorneys for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CARROLL C. NICHOLS, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
BOX ELDER BOARD OF EDUCATION, ' 
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, and DARRELL K. ] 
WHITE, Superintendent, 
Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs, ; 
UTAH STATE OFFICE OF ] 
EDUCATION, UTAH STATE 
RETIREMENT OFFICE AND STATE ] 
OF UTAH, 
) SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE 
I Civil NO. 900000542 
) Judge: Clint S. Judkins 
Third Party Defendants. 
This matter having come on regularly for oral argument before 
the above-entitled court on the 17th day of March, 1994 before the 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins, Associate District Judge, pursuant to 
Motions for Summary Judgment having been filed by all of the 
defendants and third party defendants; each of the parties having 
been given an opportunity to submit memoranda and authorities in 
APR 1 2 1994 
support of their position and the Judge of said court, after 
hearing said matter, made his ruling from the bench granting the 
defendants and third party defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment; pursuant thereto the court having directed that 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be made and 
entered in favor of the defendants and third party defendants and 
against the plaintiff, which Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law have been so made and entered and duly signed by 
the above-entitled court, 
NOW, THEREFORE, and pursuant thereto it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That summary judgment be entered in favor of all of the 
defendants and third party defendants and against the plaintiff as 
specifically set forth in the Decree and Judgment entered on the 
3rd day of December, 1993 and additionally, that the same shall 
apply to the plaintiff's Third Cause of Action set forth in the 
Second Amended Complaint. 
2. That plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint and 
Second Amended Complaint against the defendants and third party 
defendants be and the same are hereby dismissed with prejudice, no 
cause of action. * / 
DATED this ?V" day of *^{) * 1 [
 K ([ 1994 
CLINT S. JUDKINS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ,QST>+ day of 01 A, < H 
1994, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Supplemental Judgment and Decree to the following: 
John S. McAllister 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8 38 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Kevin A. Howard 
Attorneys for Utah State Retirement Board 
540 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Thomas D. Roberts 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
SECRETARY 
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